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This paper aims at estimating first the effects of defense spending on 
the main determinants of growth, and second the extent to and the channels 
through which the military debt of Greece influences the overall debt burden 
of the country, and consequently the critical determinants of economic 
growth and development. Increased imports of sophisticated weapons and 
military equipment can be financed at the cost of investment (guns v. 
ploughshares), or/and at the cost of human capital formation (guns v. butter 
and chalk), or at the cost of increasing the foreign debt of the country. It is 
this last case which is investigated in this paper. Our empirical results 
indicate that whatever the necessity and the benefits of the security aspect of 
defense, its economic costs are quite substantial. The military as a claimant 
of resources has a negative and non trivial effect on physical capital 
accumulation, and human capital formation. Moreover, financing increased 
military imports through borrowing from abroad has a negative and 
significant effect on the determinants of growth and development.     
Key Words: Defense Burden, Foreign Military Debt, Growth Rate, 
Investment, Education. 
JEL Classification: H56, H63, F34. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper aims at estimating first the effects of defense spending on 
the main determinants of growth, and second the extent to and the channels 
through which the military debt of Greece influences the overall debt burden 
of the country, and, consequently, the critical determinants of economic 
growth and development. 
Defense is a public good par excellence, and inevitably almost all of 
military expenditure (milex) comes from the government budget. Allocation 
of expenditures to procurement of sophisticated weapons and military 
equipment go, however, to a large extent to imports at the expense either of 
investment or/and of the current government spending or by increasing the 
external debt of the country. Since long-term growth rates are sensitive to 
budgetary or external imbalances, persistently high rates of military 
spending may contribute significantly to macroeconomic disequilibria. 
Investigating these issues appears to be of particular interest given 
the increased defense priorities of today on the one hand, and the pressing 
needs to meet the strict requirements for the participation in the European 
Monetary Union on the other. 
The recent disputes, conflicts and wars in the Balkans create a very 
unstable strategic environment in the area. Moreover, cumulative evidence 
suggests that Turkey has undertaken a wholesale attempt to overturn the 
power balance in the Eastern Mediterranean by increasing dramatically its 
military spending in the 90’s, by displaying force through infringements and 
violations of Greece’s air space and waters, and by raising revisionist claims 
against the post-war status quo in the Aegean.1 Table 1 presents comparative 
figures on the overall defense spending of the two countries after 1980, 
Table 2 presents the respective milex figures for procurement of weapons 
and military equipment during the same period, and Table 3 presents the 
number of yearly incidents of violations of Greek air space and  Greek 
territory since 1985. 
 The obvious divergence from the traditional levels of power balance 
in favour of Turkey during the last decade, forces Greece to increase the 
already high levels of its milex, and especially the one for procurement of 
imported weapons and military equipment. It is not yet clear whether the 
increase in military imports of approximately $1.5 billion per year, which 
was announced by the Greek government, will be at the cost of investment 
(guns v. ploughshares), at the cost of  consumption (guns v. butter and 
chalk), or at the cost of increasing the foreign debt burden of the country. It 
is this last case which is investigated in this paper.  
                                                          
1 See Balfousias and Stavrinos (1996), Platias (1997), and Stavrinos (1997)  for an insight 
into the security problems and into the role of military power in managing the current defense 
priorities of Greece.     
TABLE 1 : Yearly Military Expenditure of Greece and Turkey 








(Average) 1994  1995
GREECE      3,820 4,028 3,763 3,778 3,893
TURKEY      3,765 4,212 5,720 6,173 6,379
GR/TUR (%) 101 96 66 61 61 




TABLE 2 : Yearly Expenditure of Greece and Turkey on Procurement of Weapons and Military Equipment 








(Average) 1994  1995
GREECE      665 743 845 922 771
TURKEY      343 776 1,295 2,173 2,405
GR/TUR (%)       1094 96 65 42 32
Source : NATO, SIPRI*
*Stocholm International Peace Researche Institute 






(Average) 1994   1995 1996
Violations of Greek Air Space 363 365 695 523 1130 
Overflying Greek Territorus 8 28 117 73 559 
Total Number of Incidents 371 293 812 596 1689 





TABLE 4 : Outstanding Foreign Military Debt and Total Public Debt of Greece. 
(Millions of  Current Dollars) 
 
 
1960        1970 1980 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996
Military Debt 17 214 1,261 4,474     3,620 3,809 4,369 3,995
Civilian Debt 126 714 4,204 20,682     25,118 30,478 31,153 34,400
Total Public Debt 143 928 5,465      25,156 28,738 34,287 35,522 38,395
Source : Bank of Greece 
 
Borrowing from abroad in order to finance increased military imports may 
exert an adverse effect on both the domestic and the foreign sector: on the 
former due to the slow down of economic growth, and on the latter because 
of the burden on the balance of payments, which causes the need for more 
borrowing, thus creating a vicious cycle of an ever-increasing foreign debt. 
Table 4 presents the evolution of the outstanding foreign military debt and of 
the outstanding total foreign debt of the country.  
In section 2 we present the econometric model which is used for the  
investigation of the impact of increased military debt on the critical 
determinants of economic growth and development, in section 3 we discuss 
the data and the empirical results, and in section 4 we present a summary of 
the findings of this paper. 
 
 
2.  The model 
  
 The model to be estimated consists of the following six behavioural 
equations: 
g = g ( k, e, m, mx )    (1) 
k = k ( g, m, f, p, c )    (2) 
e = e ( g, m, n, sb, yd )    (3) 
m = m ( g, pm, Nat, Tur )   (4) 
mc = mc ( g, pc, cd )    (5) 
mm = mm ( g,  pm, md, m )   (6) 
where: 
 g = the annual growth rate of real GDP, 
 k = the share of total investment in GDP, 
 e = the share of public education expenditure in GDP, 
 m= the share of military expenditure in GDP (military burden), 
 mc = the share of non-oil civilian imports in GDP,  
 mm= the share of non-oil military imports in GDP. 
 
The full model, together with the identities and the list of the 
variables is given in the appendix. 
The first three equations represent the domestic sector of the 
economy. 
Equation (1) explains growth in terms of its main ingredients: 
accumulation of physical capital, public education expenditure as a proxy for 
the degree of mobilization of human resources, and the ratio of imports to 
exports as an index for the performance of the external sector. The military 
burden is included to account for the direct effects of military spending on 
growth in the form of spin-offs.2 In the classical framework of sufficient 
growth in demand, the level of savings constitutes the main determinant of 
growth. Assuming adequate demand for investment goods, savings are 
totally converted into investment. Sectoral allocation of investable goods and 
the choice of appropriate techniques are further determinants of the rate of 
growth on the supply side. It is, however, well-established in the literature 
that the lack of sufficient aggregate or intersectoral demand, and the level of 
absorptive capacity of the economy may constitute effective constraints to 
output expansion, especially in developing countries. A rise in savings may 
not be totally converted into productive investment either because of lack of 
sufficient domestic and foreign demand (Kaldor,1979 ) or / and the existence 
of extraneous constraints on the investment process, such as low 
profitability, the supply of skilled labour, administrative capacity, 
entrepreneurship, social compromise etc., which all together are termed «the 
absorptive capacity» of the economy.  
This explains the presence of investment instead of savings in the 
growth equation which is thus taken to represent the production function of 
the economy. Human capital formation affects production and, therefore, the 
rate of growth of the economy. The variable for the human capital formation 
used in this case, is public education expenditure. As regards defense 
expenditure, this accounts for the direct effects of military spending on 
growth. These effects may be favourable or adverse. In fact, increased 
defense spending may bring about a direct positive effect on economic 
growth through increased capacity utilisation, production and employment, 
caused by Keynasian-type demand effects. These favourable effects, 
however, tend to be offset significantly by the indirect effects of military 
spending through capital formation, skilled labour supply and various other 
externalities which may adversely affect productivity and growth in the long 
run. The direct and indirect effects must be both considered in terms of an 
overall assessment of the impact of milex on growth. The first perspective in 
this assessment refers to the so-called “modernisation models”, closely 
associated with the work of Benoit (1978). According to these, the main 
adverse effects of defense spending on growth are the following: 
 
a. Investment effects: Purchasing by the defense sector of domestic 
investment goods, or using foreign exchange to purchase imported 
goods, may lower the growth rate of the civilian output.  
                                                          
2 General surveys of the effects of military expenditure on growth and development are given 
in Cappelen et al (1984), Chan (1985, 1992), Mosley (1985), Lindgren (1988), Renner 
(1991), Isard and Anderton (1992), Pivetti (1992), UNIDIR (1993), E.C. (1994), Mintz and 
Stevenson (1995), and Ward et al (1995) among others. For comprehensive bibliographies in 
English see Klein et al (1995), Gleditsch et al (1994) and Hartley and Hooper (1990). 
b. Productivity effects: The government sector shows no 
measurable productivity increases. Thus, an enlargement in defense 
spending shifts resources from the productive to the non-productive 
sector of the economy. 
c. Income-shift effects: A shift of resources to defense reduces the 
size of the civilian, non-defense sector. Since the latter is smaller, by 
definition, than the GDP, a shift of one per cent of GDP to defense 
reduces non-defense spending by more than one percent. 
 
Turning to the favourable effects of milex on growth, one can list the 
following: 
 
a. Training effects: Military power receives training which 
introduces people to modern methods and social skills such as 
discipline and regimentation, following and transmitting precise 
instructions, living by the ‘clock’, understanding and working with 
bureaucracy, traveling around the country, maintaining and repairing 
machinery, and exposed to general inculcation of ‘national values 
and attitudes’. This professionalism and management expertise of 
the military may overflow into the civilian sector. 
b. Consumable effects: The services provide a substantial number 
of people with food, Clothing, shelter and medical care. They also 
engage in ‘civic action’ programs, in emergency operations, etc. 
c. Infrastructure effects: Military expenditure in social overhead 
capital - roads, docks, bridges, airports, communications etc. - often 
benefits directly the civilian sector especially ‘up country’. Also 
mapping, geographical and meteorological services have civilian 
spin-offs. 
d. Security effects: To the extent that the military provides security 
to the country, it enables an atmosphere conductive to investment 
and long-term planning decisions. In this respect defense can be 
viewed as a form of insurance policy towards actual or perceived 
threats to national interests. Threats can reflect a struggle for power, 
resources or ‘national values’, or any kind of difference perceived as 
weakening a nations security. 
 
It is argued in the literature that the combination of favourable and 
unfavorable effects of military spending produce non linearities  between the 
level of milex and the rate of growth: at low levels of defense spending and 
low levels of development, the favourable effects dominate the unfavourable 
ones inducing a positive relation between milex and growth. Beyond a 
certain level, however, the impact of milex on growth becomes negative as 
the resource use effect comes to dominate.      
Turning to the last explanatory variable in this equation, namely the 
external transactions, it is chiefly used to indicate the existence of an 
external constraint imposed on the growth rate of the economy. The 
discussion regarding the reasoning on which this variable is introduced in 
the analysis, as well as the specific role of the external sector, are examined 
later on in this paper. 
Equation (2) makes the share of total investment in GDP a function 
of military burden, the rate of growth, and the GDP shares of the net foreign 
capital inflow, of the  total profits and of the total credit to the private sector. 
Much theoretical and mostly empirical research has shown that defense 
expenditures have a greater and more pernicious crowding-out effect than 
other related forms of national and governmental spending.3 This area of 
research utilizes the so called ‘capital formation models’ to explore the chain 
of causality leading from increased milex to lower investment and growth 
rates, to the extent that increased defense spending entails higher tax rates or 
government borrowing. This analysis is usually conducted in terms of shares 
in GDP. Of course, one cannot rule out the case of both investment and 
milex rising together, with no absolute crowding-out. However, if the ‘social 
wage hypothesis’ is right, then, in terms of ratios, there is an increased 
probability of one-to-one trade-off between defense and investment.  
This is mostly the case of developed democratic societies in which, 
for a given level of GDP, the share of social wage is relatively inflexible, 
since governments in these countries face electoral costs and high 
institutional pressure which prevent them from attempting to reduce the 
proportion of social wage to national income for longer periods. The story 
may be somewhat different for developing countries: the limited national 
budgets and the non-existence of capital markets, result in defense budgets 
mainly at the expense of social expenditure, such as education, health, 
housing, transport etc. This forces the people to spend more on health, 
education, and so on, thus increasing their consumption expenditure, and 
reducing the saving ratio. In turn, lower savings lead to low investment, and 
hence to declining growth rates. In addition, government investment, a major 
engine to growth in these economies, falls, with debilitating consequences 
on the economy.  
There are other ways also in which increased defense spending may 
crowd-out investment in developing economies: military procurement tends 
to be highly import demanding than other forms of public spending, and thus 
contributes considerably to an unfavourable balance of payments. Moreover, 
foreign exchange to import all kinds of goods is limited and an increase in 
defense procurement eventually decreases the amount of foreign exchange to 
import investment goods. Some also argue that since technical progress in 
developing economies tends to be embodied in new capital, crowding out of 
                                                          
3 For some recent contributions see Chan (1992), and Gold (1993). 
investment retards also technical progress and affects productivity and 
technological position. For a developing economy we may conclude that, 
although the military contributes to some extent to absorptive capacity, 
nevertheless, the net long run effect of defense spending on investment will 
be depressive because of crowding-out and the indirect effects on human 
capital formation. The presence of the other explanatory variables in 
equation (2) is easily explained,  with growth rate capturing cycle effects.  
Equation (3) explains the share of public education in GDP in terms 
of the growth rate, the share of military expenditure, the rate of population 
growth, the social budget and the per capita disposal income. Human capital 
formation is a key policy objective in both developed and developing 
countries. It is widely considered as an important determinant of absorptive 
capacity, productivity and technological progress and, therefore, a crucial 
element of production, growth and development.4 The effects of military 
expenditure on human capital accumulation operate in several ways. 
According to Deger(1986) these are termed as ‘spin-offs’, ‘social attitude 
effects’, ‘growth effects’ and ‘government revenue constraint effects’. The 
share of public expenditure in GDP is the usual operational proxy for the 
quality of human capital in empirical considerations, since it is widely 
accepted as the main, and probably overwhelming determinant of absorptive 
capacity, social mobility, and labour-augmented technological progress.  
The direction in which the level of military burden affects the share 
of education in GDP, determines also, in all probability, the rate of growth of 
human capital. Under the government revenue constraint, one must expect a 
negative relation between defense spending and human capital formation. 
The improvement of human capital can be stimulated through government 
spending on health, and other social services as well. However, an increase 
in the share of social spending may crowd out education expenditure, and 
consequently, the net effect of an increase in the share of social spending 
(net of education) cannot be determined on a priori considerations. The 
effect of per capita real disposal income is expected to be positive, whereas, 
the presence of the rate of growth of GDP and the rate of growth of 
population in equation (3) is easily explained. 
The military burden in equation (4) is considered as a function of the 
growth rate, the price of military equipment, the external threat and 
spillovers. As discussed earlier, the major determinants of military burden in 
Greece are the twin concepts of ‘security’ and ‘threat’5. One may also 
consider spillovers since Greece is a member of the NATO alliance.6 As 
                                                          
4 Looney (1992), and Aben and Daurès (1993) constitute important recent contributions on 
the issue.  
5 See Stavrinos (1992). 
6 See Lazaretou and Kapopoulos (1993), Kollias (1995), and Balfousias and Stavrinos (1996) 
for the determinants of defense spending in Greece. 
threat variable we introduced the military burden of Turkey and as spillovers 
the military burden of the NATO European countries, other than Greece and 
Turkey. In addition, economic variables might be important, and certain 
theories have been proposed to analyse such determinants of defense 
spending. Per capita income and government revenue or expenditure are the 
most frequent explanatory variables in such empirical considerations. Since 
all these variables are positively related to growth , we included the rate of 
growth of real GDP as the overwhelming economic variable in sustaining 
high rates of milex.  
A negative association between growth and defense could be also 
plausible, however, since we might expect that a country with greater 
strategic problems, such as Greece, will go for a high defense share of 
national output, even though its growth rate is low; security considerations 
where, and still are paramount for Greece, even with major economic 
problems elsewhere. The issue, therefore, is mostly empirical and the  proof 
of the pudding will be in the eating. Prices are expected to come up with a 
negative sign as usual. 
The next two equations, together with the identities in the appendix, 
trace the channels through which the foreign military debt generates adverse 
repercussions on the overall debt, and subsequently on the domestic sector of 
the economy. Exports are considered exogenous in this model, while the 
demand for imports is endogenous for both civilian goods and military 
equipment, and is taken to be affected by arguments traditionally used in 
such cases, like the domestic activity and prices. The key variable to 
consider in this case is the payments for both civilian and military 
outstanding debt, which is expected to exercise an expansionary effect on the 
imports of both categories.7 These two equations, and particularly the one 
describing the behaviour of military imports, are crucial for the analysis 
since they indicate how the external debt, both civilian and military, is 
involved in an amphidromous relationship with the rest of the endogenous 
variables in the model. 
                                                          
7 See Athanasoglou and Zombanakis (1992), for the effects of the external debt on the 
Macroeconomic Policy of a small open economy like Greece. See also Rothschild (1973), 
Deger (1986), Chan (1988), and Gold (1990) for some significant contributions in the area.   
3.  The data and empirical results 
 
 This analysis uses annual data for the period 1958 to 1993. Military 
expenditure is usually reported in current prices in local currency terms. For 
most purposes of economic analysis, however, it is the share of military 
expenditure to GDP - the military burden - that is of most interest because it 
reflects the relative priority given by the state to military demands and 
because it measures the relative burden or resource costs.8 Its calculation 
does not depend on the choice of a specific price index, since it is the ratio of 
two measures in current domestic currency. It is a pure number that can be 
compared over time and across countries and it is by now extensively used in 
empirical investigations. There is, however, caution expressed in the 
literature in that measuring the military spending and the other variables in 
the model as shares or proportions of GDP, can be misleading and may 
introduce biases in the measurement of certain coefficients (e.g. see Chan, 
1985).  
 A change in the defense burden can result from either a change in 
military expenditure (the numerator) or a change in GDP (the denominator), 
which in turn raises the following concerns: First, assume that a country’s 
military expenditure has remained constant for a certain period of time, 
whereas, GDP has grown. In this case though the actual amount of defense 
spending has not changed, the defense burden would drop. More important, 
the decrease in the defense burden could be misinterpreted as having caused 
the economic growth, when the growth was due entirely to extraneous 
factors. Second, the GDP variable appears on both sides of the equations. 
For example, it is used as the denominator for measuring the military burden 
on the right hand side of the investment equation and as the denominator on 
the left hand side of the same equation for measuring the share of investment 
in GDP. An increase in GDP will naturally result in lower defense and 
investment shares. Thus, with constant levels of military expenditure and 
investment but an expanding economy - due for example to the utilization of 
existing capacity - the over-time decline in the defense burden will be 
positively correlated with the over-time decline in its investment share, and 
this positive correlation between the two variables will bias upwards the 
coefficient of the defense burden in this equation. Third, the growth rate is 
introduced as the dependent variable in the growth equation, and also as an 
explanatory variable in the other equations. Following the steps of the 
previous reasoning, there is the danger of a built-in negative correlation 
because positive and certainly increasing growth rates on the one side of the 
equations will necessarily mean a decrease in the shares of the defense 
or/and the investment etc., on the other side of the equations. 
                                                          
8 See Goertz and Diehl (1986), and Herrera  (1994), for the comparison of different 
approaches in measuring military allocations.  
 The foregoing discussion raises concerns as to whether we should 
focus on the levels of the defense burden, the investment share etc., or 
should we focus on the changes of these variables. Chan (1984) identified 
two quite distinct data patterns characterizing the OECD countries: whereas 
high levels of defense burdens tend to be negatively correlated with 
economic growth, high rates of increase in defense burdens tend to be 
positively correlated with economic growth. These patterns feature 
respectively, the stagnant economies of the larger and more established 
OECD members with their relatively high but steady defense spending on 
one hand, and the smaller and newly industrializing OECD members - like 
Greece in the sixties and seventies or Turkey in the eighties and nineties - 
with rapidly increasing defense spending and growth on another. In 
estimating the proposed model we measure our variables as percentages of 
GDP.  
 Looking at the performance of the Greek economy, we did not 
justify the drawbacks which have been pointed out in the foregoing 
discussion, during the period considered. Neither defense or investment 
expenditures - as well as the other variables in the model - remained 
constant, even in real terms, over a shorter or longer period of time. Instead, 
a variety of economic policies and security considerations, reflecting the 
unstable political and strategic environment of post-war Greece, allowed the 
variables to have enough independent variation over time. Consequently, the 
analysis in terms of GDP percentages has been considered most appropriate 
in order to investigate the effects on economic growth of the priorities given 
by the state to military demands. The effects of changes in the defense 
priorities became more pronounced in cases like the Turkish invasion in 
Cyprus in 1974 and the Greek-Turkish crises in 1982 and 1987, in which 
adjustment of the defense priorities became imperative, resulting in the 
reallocation of resources and thus affecting the growth prospects of the 
country. 
 Estimation of the proposed model, requires us to provide a specific 
functional form for the stochastic equations of the model. Since economic 
theory does not provide any guide as to the functional form of any of these 
equations we approach the issue empirically. As a first step, all the variables 
in the stochastic equations have been expressed in natural logs and tested for 
integration. The results of the ADF-tests, or the Perron (1990) test in cases of 
notable shifts in the variables in Table 5, indicate that all variables are I(1), 
with the exception of p (the share of profits to GDP) and pm (prices of 
imported goods) which are I(2), and n (the rate of growth of population) and 
Tur (the military burden of Turkey) which appear to be I(0). 
TABLE 5 : ADF (or Perron) Test Statistics for Unit Root 
Variables Levels First Differences Second Differences 
g - 1,83 - 4,03** - 
k - 2,30 - 6,17** - 
l - 2,01 - 4,32** - 
m - 1,69 - 4,86** - 
mx - 2,38 - 4,27** - 
f - 1,19 - 3,19* - 
p - 0,11 - 2,07  - 6,38**
c - 1,29 - 4,76** - 
n - 4,56** - - 
sb - 2,01 - 3,85** - 
yd - 2,59 - 3,35* - 3,90**
pm   0,82 - 1,61 - 
Nat - 1,79 - 4,25** - 
Tur - 4,74**     - - 
mc - 1,22 - 4,11** - 
pc   0,40 - 4,57** - 
cd - 1,63 - 4,09** - 
mm - 1,56 - 4,69** - 
md - 1,06 - 5,76** - 
 
Note :   *    indicates significance at the 5% level. 
  ** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
Mackinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root are -2,93 and 
-3,59 for the 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
The description of the variables is given in the appendix. 
 
 
TABLE 6 : Pairwise Granger Cousality between the Endogenous Variables. 
Ho : X does not Granger Cause Y F - Statistic 
g → k 3,15*
 → e 3,68*
 → m 4,09*
 → mc 3,67*
 → mm 2,78*
k  → g 3,43*
    → m 1,18 
 e  → g 2,51 




mc → g 10,42**
mm → g 4,61*
 
Note :   * Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 ** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 In addition of the previous theoretical considerations, we next 
investigated the empirical causal links between the endogenous variables. 
The results of Granger causality tests in Table 6 - augmented to incorporate 
contemporaneous causality as well - provide statistical support to our 
theoretical model and further guidance as to the inclusion of certain variables 
in the individual equations. 
 In the next step we investigated empirically the existence of 
equilibrium relationships between the variables in the individual equations 
using the Johansen and Juselious (1990) M.L. procedure. The results in 
Table 7 indicate the existence of exactly one such normalized equilibrium 
relationship for the equations (1), (2), (3), and (5), and two cointegrating 
relationships for the equations (4), and (6). 
 
TABLE 7 : Johansen Cointegration Tests for the Six Equations. 
 
VARIABLES IN THE  
EQUATION 
Eigenvalues Likelihood Ratio Hypothesized No.  
of C.E(s)  
g, k, e, m, mx 0,59 76,51 None*
 0,37 40,82 At most 1 
L.R test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 5% level 
k, g, m, f, p, c 0,69 110,36 None*
 0,56 70,28 At most 1 
L.R test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 5% level. 
e, g, m, n, sb, yd 0,84 140,12 None**
 0,53 75,88 At most 1 
L.R test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 1% level. 
m, g, pm, Nat, Tur 0,74 125,01 None**
 0,58 74,12 At most 1**
 0,32 18,51 At most 2 
L.R test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at the 1% level 
mc, g, cd, pc 0,63 62,79 None**
 0,34 27,17 At most 1 
L.R test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 1% level 
mm, g, m, pm, md 0,69 89,82 None**
 0,45 48,27 At most 1*
 0,36 26,87 At most 2 
L.R test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at the 5% level 
Note :   * Indicates rejection of the Null Hypothesis at the 5% level. 
 ** Indicates rejection of the Null Hypothesis at the 1% level. 
 
 Since one of our primary interests is to look into the dynamics of 
mutual interactions between the endogenous variables, we have searched for 
the cointegrating equations using the general to specific methodology of 
Hendry (1986). Due to sample size limitations we started with two lags in 
each variable, and deleting the insignificant lags after a rigorous testing, we 
ended up with the final six OLS equations. In the next step the individual 
OLS equations were re-estimated within the context of a simultaneous 
equations system, using the estimation method of 3SLS.  
TABLE 8 : 3SLS, System Estimates, 1957-1993*
 
gt =  -1,30   - 0,23gt-1   + 0,63kt   + 0,35kt-1    + 0,29et   - 0,30mt-1   - 0,18mt-2   - 0,38mxt
          
         
          
         
      
        
(-1,56) (-2,32) (3,17) (2,41) (2,21) (-2,50) (-2,11) (-2,73)
 
kt = 1,05 + 0,68kt-1 + 0,20gt + 0,08gt-1 - 0,15mt + 0,05ft + 0,03ft-1 - 0,04pt + 0,09ct 
 (2,43) (6,85) (3,71) (2,92) (-2,54) (2,38) (2,02) (-2,23) (3,13)
 
et = 0,66 + 0,90le-1 + 0,04gt - 0,08nt - 0,02mt - 0,02sbt -  0,01sbt-1 - 0,02ydt-1 
(2,10) (11,02) (1,95) (-2,24) (-2,31) (-2,18) (-1,98) (-2,13)
 
mt = 1,42 + 0,76mt-1 - 0,08gt - 0,05pmt - 0,47Natt + 0,13Turt + 0,08Turt-1 
 (2,06) (6,63) (-1,97) (-1,80) (-2,23) (2,36) (2,05)
 
mct = 1,34 + 0,60mct-1 + 0,51gt + 0,09cdt-1 - 0,07pct 
   (3,44) (4,99) (2,98) (2,43) (-2,13)
 
mmt = 0,73 + 0,80mmt-1 - 0,09gt - 0,28pmt + 0,16mt + 0,10mt + 0,16mt-1 
  (2,58) (9,24) (-3,73) (-1,78) (3,44) (2,08) (2,39)
 
* Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
TABLE 9 : Equation Diagnostics 
 
       g k l m mc mm
R2 0,63      0,90 0,96 0,86 0,91 0,95
D.W.    2,18 2,23 1,87 2,01 1,97 1,98
AR(1) & AR(2) (F) 1,43 0,57 0,26 0,03 0,46 0,10 
  (0,25) (0,57) (0,77) (0,97) (0,63) (0,90)
ARCH-1 (F) 0,12 0,12 0,01 2,08 0,19 0,46 
  (0,73) (0,73) (0,91) (0,16) (0,66) (0,50)
Normality (X2) 4,03 1,14 2,48 0,12 2,82 2,70 
  (0,13) (0,56) (0,28) (0,94) (0,26) (0,25)
Heteroscedasticity (F) 1,81 0,60 0,25 0,59 0,73 1,02 
  (0,12) (0,80) (0,99) (0,81) (0,67) (0,49)
Functional Form (F) (11,02)  ** 0,55     0,31 0,002 0,000 0,002
  (0,001) (0,46) (0,58) (0,96) (0,98) (0,96)
 
Figures in parentheses indicate the probability of the null hypothesis. 
  * The null hypothesis is rejected at the 0,05 level. 
** The null hypothesis is rejected at the 0,01 level. 
 
TABLE 10 : Solved Static Long - Run Equations1 
 
gt =  -1,06   + 0,80kt  + 0,24et - 0,37mt   - 0,31mxt Wald - X2(4) = 20,87  (p=0,0003)**
       
        
        
       
       
(-5,14) (2,71) (2,28)   (-2,63) (-2,40)
 
kt = 3,28 + 0,88gt - 0,47mt + 0,24ft - 0,11pt + 0,29ct Wald - X2(5) = 21,84  (p=0,0006)** 
  (2,48) (3,99) (-2,83) (2,48) (-2,12) (3,51)
 
et = 6,59 + 0,36gt - 0,79nt - 0,21mt - 0,32sbt - 0,22ydt Wald - X2(5) = 32,74  (p=0,0002)** 
 (4,62) (2,26)   (-2,86) (-2,45) (-2,83)  (-2,65)    
 
mt = 5,92 - 0,33gt - 0,23pmt - 1,98Natt + 0,89Turt Wald - X2(4) = 9,87  (p=0,043)* 
  (2,72) (-2,16) (-1,98) (-2,53) (2,47)
 
mct = 3,34 + 1,28gt + 0,09cdt - 0,07pct  Wald - X2(3) = 45,76  (p=0,0000)** 
   (4,78) (3,22) (2,67) (-2,33)
 
mmt = 3,65 - 0,45gt - 1,42pmt + 0,82mdt + 1,31mt Wald - X2(4) = 9,63  (p=0,047)* 
   (2,90) (-4,61) (-2,02) (4,01) (2,69)
 
1 Figures in parenteses are t - values 
  * Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
The significant gains in efficiency indicated the existence of correlation 
among the residuals of the individual equations. Table 8 reports the final 
3SLS estimates. We also re-estimated the model over the period 1958 - 
1987, with the observations for the next six years up to 1993 reserved for 
testing the forecasting performance of the estimated model. The estimated 
equations over the full sample fitted the data well by standard criteria, and 
survived the usual battery of within-sample diagnostic tests, for normal 
white-noise residuals. Table 9 summarizes the results of these diagnostic 
tests and the forecasting RMSPE (Root Mean Square Percentage Error) for 
the six equations, and Table 10 gives the solved long-run (cointegrating) 
equations and the direct effects of each variable on the dependent ones in 
terms of elasticities. 
 One may accept that defense spending made tangible contributions 
to the civilian economy during the crucial years following the end of the 
second world war and the consequent civil war, by feeding, clothing and 
housing a considerable number of people, providing medical care, vocational 
and technical training, and engaging in a variety of technical and scientific 
civic-action programs. Estimation of an analogous model over the period 
1948-1960 (e.g. see Stavrinos, 1993a), showed, indeed, a positive, though 
not significant, effect of military spending on growth during this early stage 
of development. However, during the high growth period of the sixties and 
seventies, there was sufficient advance in development so as the civilian 
sector not to get much leverage from the modernization induced by the 
military. At the same time, the economy was not advanced enough to benefit 
from the military-industrial complex, and consequently the beneficial spin-
off  of defense spending became less important compared to the negative 
allocation and mobilization effects.  
 Nevertheless, the considerable increase of per capita income 
sustained the unprecedented levels of public expenditure by the rising base 
of taxation purposes, and the modest defense burdens were easily 
accommodated with temporary short term adjustments without considerably 
depriving investment and the social budget. The heavy defense burdens 
which followed the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the consequent 
tension in the Aegean, combined with the depressing effects of the first oil-
crisis, put a strain on government budgets with defense crowding investment 
and the social wage. The negative effects were reinforced in the eighties and 
nineties when low to zero growth rates, progressive inflation, and underflow 
of investment were confronted with increased social spending and pertaining 
high defense burdens, thus driving to extremes the public civilian and 
military debt of the country. Overall, we may conclude that the growth-
defense relationship has passed through different stages of intensity, with the 
negative mobilization and allocation effects of the last two decades highly 
dominating the weak spin-offs of the fifties and sixties. 
 Coming to investable resources we observe that the estimated 
coefficient of the defense share in the investment equation is significant and 
negative. There is little doubt in that an increase in defense spending leads to 
a reduction in investment as a proportion of GDP. The magnitude, however, 
of the estimated elasticity is well bellow unity and this reflects an almost 
equal effect on the social headings of the budget as well. The negative sign 
of the share of profits is rather surprising and combined with the low 
elasticity of the total credit to the private sector indicates the prevalence of 
conditions of low absorptive capacity in the productive sector. Foreign 
capital inflow did have a positive effect, although not enough to offset the 
diversion of domestic funds from investment to military expenditure (see 
also Stavrinos, 1993, p. 826). 
 The elasticity of the share of public education in GDP with respect 
to military burden was found negative and statistically significant, indicating 
a moderate crowding out between defense spending and education over the 
period considered. Results, however, in Stavrinos (1993a) over the period 
1960-1983, revealed a positive but not significant correlation between the 
two indices (the estimated elasticity was 0.246). One can observe that the 
share of public education in GDP  remained constant until the end of the 
seventies, and certainly on the low side to support a balanced growth-
development strategy. It is evident that the emphasis was put on physical 
capital formation, whereas human capital was almost neglected. The 
educational reform which was initiated in the mid-sixties was blocked out by 
the repressive military regime until 1974, and despite the consequent social 
pressure the strict budgets of the following decades could not accommodate 
any but small increases in the share of education to GDP.  
 On the other hand, these small increases in educational expenditure 
were accompanied by sharp increases in defense burdens, resulting thus in a 
degree of positive but not significant correlation. This, however, does not 
reflect the competing nature of the two headings of the budget which is 
expressed through the indirect effects of defense spending on education. 
According to Stavrinos (1993a), one way of looking into this relation is the 
following: During 1983 the shares of defense and education in GDP were 
7.2 and 3.2 respectively, whereas the actual sums involved were 196 and 86 
billion drachmas. If the share of the military in GDP could be brought down 
to the 1961-1973 (before the invasion in Cyprus) mean level of  4.7% (a 
reduction of 2.5%) this could allow actual public educational expenditure to 
increase by 80%. These figures leave but little doubt about the «hidden» 
trade-off  between defense and public education expenditure. 
 
 
Table 11 : Long-run Elasticities of of the Main Enologeuous  
Variables with Respect to Military Debt 
 
 g k e m mc mm 
md -0,3 -0,3 -0,1 0,8 -0,3 0,9 
 
The results for civilian imports may be considered as normal for a 
developing country like Greece for which the determinants of external trade 
are of a structural nature. The positive sign of the growth variable reflects 
the strong import penetration over the post war period, even under the 
sharply accumulating civilian debt (as a share of GDP) during the eighties 
and nineties. The equation for military imports on the other hand indicates 
that an increase of 1% in the military burden increases military imports 
directly by 1.31%, whereas 82% of any increase in the military debt is 
directed to military imports. Finally, the long-run elasticities of the main 
endogenous variables with respect to military debt are given in Table 11, and 
it can be seen that these effects are negative and quite significant. 
 
 
4.  Summary and conclusions 
 
In this econometric investigation we have tried first to estimate the 
economic effects of defense spending on the growth-development process of 
Greece over the period 1958-1993, and second to estimate the effects of 
financing the increased defense needs of today by increasing the military 
debt of the country. 
It is by now well established in the literature that defense spending 
can affect the growth and development process directly through the Benoit-
type spin-off, and indirectly by influencing the supply of investable 
resources (savings), the absorption of available resources (investment), the 
formation of human capital (education, health, etc.), and the performance of 
the external sector (trade balance). The empirical results of this study 
indicate that in the case of Greece, the defense-growth relationship does not 
support the basic Benoit hypothesis that the military can have a positive 
direct effect on growth. The coefficient of the defense burden in the growth 
equation which is meant to capture the spin-off of defense spending on 
growth, was found to be negative and significant. This mostly reflects the 
weak military-industrial link in the post-war Greece. Arms production 
constitutes the main link between the military and the absorptive capacity of 
the economy. It stimulates strong backward and technical linkages in the 
productive sector, creating thus interindustrial demand and influencing the 
pattern of resource allocation, with a concomitant spin-off for the underlying 
industrial base. In the case of Greece, however, arms production remained on 
a very low scale compared to arms imports, because the necessary industrial 
and human-capital base to support the military-industrial complex was 
inadequate. Our empirical estimates also reveal the indirect growth-
depressing effects of defense spending on the mobilization and absorption of 
investable resources. The military, as a claimant for resources, has negative 
and non trivial effects on saving and investment which, under the present 
economic conditions  and the recent trend for increasing the military 
spending, can be considered as prohibitive for the prospects of the domestic 
economy. Although our model detects a low negative association between 
defense spending and education, nevertheless, considering their actual shares 
in GDP, one may easily identify the hidden but hard trade-of between the 
two headings of the budget. Finally, the effects of financing an increase in 
military spending by increasing the military debt of the country, are found to 
be significant but on the low scale compared to the effects of increasing the 
civilian debt. 
 Our empirical results for Greece indicate that, whatever the necessity 
and the benefits of the security aspect of defense, its economic costs are 
quite substantial. However, the strategic environment and mainly the conflict 
with Turkey constitute the overall determinant of the nature and the quantity 
of military expenditure. The arms race between Greece and Turkey is 
becoming again a crucial element in studying the economic prospects of the 
country.    
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The complete model and the description of the variables is as follows: 
  
 g = g( k, e, m, mx ) 
  k = k( g, m, f, p, c, ) 
  e = e( g, m, n, sb, yd ) 
              m = m( g, pm, Nat, Tur ) 
            mc =  mc ( g, pc, cd ) 
           mm =  mm ( g,  pm, md, m ) 
            mc = ( MC/GDP )*100 
           mm = ( MM/GDP )*100 
             M = MC + MM + MPET  
           TIP =  ic * Dc-1 + im * Dm-1 + IP 
          INV = TIR - TIP 
         CRA = ( X - M ) + INV 
            mx = ( M/X )*100 
              L = CRA - PUVP + AML - EAO - dGR + dR 
 f = ( PUVP/GDP )*100 
            cd = ( CD/GDP )*100  
           md = ( MD/GDP )*100 
          CD = L - AML + CDc-1
         MD = D - CD  
 
The variables used in the model above are represented as follows: 
 
g Rate of Growth of Real GDP 
k National Investment Spending as GDP Share 
e Public Education Spending as GDP Share  
m National Military Spending as GDP Share  
mx Import to Export Bill Analogy  
f Net Private Capital Inflow as GDP Share  
p Total Profits  of the Private Sector as a GDP Share 
c Total Credit to the Private Sector as GDP Share 
n Rate of Population Growth 
sb Social Budget Net of Defense and Education as a GDP share 
yd Disposable per Capita Income 
pm Military Import Prices ( Non-Oil )  
Tur Turkish Military Expenditure/GDP Ratio 
Nat NATO Members Military Expenditure / GDP Ratio (excluding 
Greece and Turkey ) 
mc Total Civilian Import Expenditure Less Oil as a GDP share  
mm Total Military Import Expenditure as a GDP share  
pc Civilian Import Prices ( Non-Oil )  
cd Outstanding External Civilian Debt as a GDP share 
md Outstanding External Military Debt as a GDP share 
MM Total Military Imports 
MC Total Civilian Imports  
CRA Current Account Deficit 
X Total Exports Value 
M Total Imports Value 
INV Balance of Invisibles 
TIR Total Invisible Earnings 
TIP Total Invisible Payments 
ic Interest Rate on Foreign Civilian Debt 
im Interest Rate on Foreign Military Debt 
D Outstanding External Total Debt as a GDP share 
IP Invisible Payments Less Interest Payments on Debt 
MPET Total Oil Import Expenditure 
L New Gross Loans From International Markets 
PUVP Private Sector Net Capital Inflow 
AML Amortisation Payments 
EAO Errors and Omissions 
dGR Gold Revaluation 
dR Change in Foreign Reserves 
CD Total Civilian Debt Outstanding 
MD Total Military Debt Outstanding 
 
